In March 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense convened more than 100 participants from over two dozen federal agencies for a tabletop exercise aimed at improving defenses against small drone incursions at domestic military installations.
Organized by the Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) and supported by RAND, the event marked the sixth in a series of counter-UAS planning exercises and focused specifically on operations within the continental United States.
The growing threat of small drones to military bases, first formally recognized by defense leaders in 2016 during operations against ISIS, has prompted a decade of research, technology development and policy scrutiny.
While previous efforts have centered largely on overseas deployments, this exercise explored the challenges of coordinating counter-UAS operations at home, where airspace is shared with civilians and navigating legislative issues makes things more complex.
Two military sites, Fort Bliss in Texas and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii, served as the basis for the scenarios. Participants were asked to respond to simulated incursions involving multiple drones with varying flight paths, altitudes and levels of threat.
The scenarios were designed to test coordination between federal, state and local authorities and to assess how U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) might synchronize operations to defend military assets on American soil.
The exercise produced three major findings:
1. Operational Triggers for USNORTHCOM Involvement
Participants identified specific conditions under which USNORTHCOM should lead homeland counter-drone responses. These include enxames de drones that overwhelm base defenses, simultaneous incursions at multiple high-priority installations and incidents that erode public confidence in military security.
The exercise also validated the use of deployable “fly-away” kits – modular counter-UAS packages that can be dispatched to threatened bases.
2. Integration of Civil Authorities
Emphasizing that local responders are often the first to detect or respond to drone activity, the exercise highlighted the need for a framework that incorporates state, local, tribal and territorial partners.
One potential solution discussed was leveraging National Guard Civil Support Teams, which can respond within 90 minutes and already operate across the U.S. with 24/7 availability.
3. Escalation and FAA Coordination
The scenarios helped clarify when technologies like GPS jamming or spoofing might be used domestically. While public sentiment generally supports counter-drone operations at military bases, participants noted that the FAA remains cautious about authorizing such measures except in extreme cases.
A layered defense strategy, ranging from non-lethal jamming to kinetic interception, was endorsed as a scalable approach.
CONTEÚDO RELACIONADO: Antigo coronel partilha lições do exercício de integração de drones de emergência do Oklahoma
Crédito da imagem da publicação: U.S Army
